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1 Introduction
In its Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, the European Convention has
introduced Article 59 in order to allow member states to withdraw from the European Union.
In the Draft Treaty, Article 59 reads as
Any Member State may withdraw from the European Union in accordance
with its own constitutional requirements.
In this paper, we analyze what the economic theory would predict to be the consequences
of the proposed Article 59. Our concern is that this article may lead to strategic use of threat
of withdrawal in case the leaders of the other member states believe that such a threat will
be carried out. We do not take a stance to the question of under what circumstances an
individual member state should have an option to resign from the European Union. Rather,
we ask whether such a possibility, at the disposal of leaders of individual member states,
might have unintended consequences.
We analyze the following game. First, national electorates choose political leaders that
represent their countries in the Union. Second, one of the member states gets an opportu-
nity to present an ultimatum to the other member states stating that it will withdraw from
the Union unless it receives a certain concession. We model these concessions as ine¢ cient
transfers but they could also be di¤erent formulations of given policies. Third, the other
member states have to decide whether they accept or reject the ultimatum. If they accept,
they have to make the required concession. If other member states do not accept the ultima-
tum, the leader who presented the ultimatum must decide whether to carry out his threat
or not. Withdrawal is costly to the withdrawing member state but also to the remaining
member states as they lose the benets from a larger common market. If the leaders of other
member states consider the threat of withdrawal credible, they should be willing to pay to
avoid it. If, on the other hand, they believe the threat not to be credible, they should reject
the ultimatum.
A threat of secession is credible only if the leaders of other member states expect that
the leader threatening to withdraw from the Union would rather carry out his threat, after
making it publicly, than lose face by not carrying it out. In our model, not all politicians are
able to make credible threats. Indeed, we view such politicians to be rare. We have in mind
politicians like de Gaulle, Thatcher, and Berlusconi who are willing to be uncompromising
in order to gain at the expense of other member states in intergovernmental negotiations.
We call such a quality stubbornness. We dene it as a politicians ability to commit to
withdrawing from the Union, even when withdrawal is costly to his country, if his demands
for concessions are not met.
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We show, rst of all, that the proposed constitution would give su¢ ciently stubborn
politicians an opportunity to extract concessions from other member states. We also nd
that voters in individual member states would su¤er from a Prisoners Dilemma: It is often
optimal for voters to choose stubborn politicians, who are expected to fare well in intergov-
ernmental negotiations, even if these would be otherwise less competent than their opponents.
Consequently, all member states lose in terms of the expected utility of their citizens.
We also show that a requirement that the withdrawal must be approved in a national
referendum would eliminate these problems. Stubborn politicians could then no longer cred-
ibly use the threat of secession as a way to obtain transfers from other member states. As a
result, national electorates would no longer have an incentive to choose stubborn politicians
to represent them in intergovernmental negotiations. This leads us to suggest, in case article
59 is otherwise maintained, an addition to paragraph 1:
"Withdrawal shall be subject to a binding referendum in which all citizens of
the Member State considering withdrawal shall be entitled to participate, with a
requirement that a majority of participants votes in favour of withdrawal."
Introducing the requirement of a referendum would require changing the constitution in some
member states, including Germany, which have not specied a role for referenda.
While much attention has been devoted to voting rules, the proposed Article 59 has
received much less attention in public debate.1 The members of the Convention, however,
have made more than 40 suggestions for changes to this article.2 The suggestions can be
divided in three main tendencies. First, several participants of the Convention argue that
such a provision is in conict with the special nature of the European integration as more
than just a "classical international treaty". Many of them do, however, suggest that member
states should have an option to withdraw in case they do not accept some future change to the
Constitution. Second, some have suggested revisions aiming at an opposite direction. These
revisions would introduce a new category of associate membership, which would e¤ectively
render it easier to opt out of most union policies, apart from the common market. Finally,
some view that withdrawal is already covered by the Treaty of Vienna, and that the article
is therefore not needed.3 M. Louis Michel et al. suggest that a decision on resignation should
be made according to the same procedure as a decision to join, and Mr. Juraj Miga of
Slovakia suggests:
1For economic analyses of decision making mechanisms in the EU, see, for instance, Baldwin et al. (2001).
2Suggested changes are recorded at the European Convention (2003).
3Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties was adopted in 1969 by the United Nations Conference on
the Law of Treaties, with entry into force in 1980.
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Any Member State may withdraw from the European Union in accordance
with its own constitutional requirements, including national referendum.
An important concern of the proposed Article 59 was raised by the members of the
European Peoples Party Convention group:
"We continue to question the need for this exit clause - which at present
is not part of acquis communautaire - and would prefer its deletion from the
draft Constitution. Such an explicit exit clause would allow Member States to
blackmail the Union, paralyse its decision-making processes and even endanger
the stability of the Union".
They argue that an exit clause, if included, should be balanced by a right of the other member
states to expel a member state which violates the Unions common values.
Our paper is related to two distinct lines of literature. First, it is related to the literature
studying the rationale and desirability of secession clauses in unions or federations. Bor-
dignon and Brusco (2001) study whether it is optimal to include secession rules in a federal
constitution in a setting where future benets created by the federation are uncertain. Even
if the constitution does not allow secession, secession is always possible through a costly
independence war. In their model, the aim of the secession rule is to reduce the costs of
break up in the possible case that the federation turns out to be no longer e¢ cient, but at
the same time it also reduces the ex ante incentives of the countries to join the federation.
In Buchanan and Faith (1987), the introduction of secession rules works as a constraint on
the possibly exploitative behavior of the ruling political coalition. In other words, secession
protects individual freedom. Apolte (1997) builds on the paper by Buchanan and Faith in
a setting where the federal government not only may grow excessively but also protects citi-
zens from their own local governments. He focuses on the proposal of Vaubel (1994) to allow
secession from the EU by a simple majority of population.4
Second, the paper is related to the literature on strategic delegation. In our paper strategic
delegation is related to bargaining, i.e. delegation by the principals is followed by bargaining
by the agents. This is usually not the case in the literature on strategic delegation. An
exception is Segendor¤ (1998) where two principals (nations) delegate the task of bargaining
over the provision of public good to an agent. The choice of agent may create a threat to the
other nations agent. Depending on the authorities granted to the agent, this may encourage
4There is a large literature studying the integration and break up of countries not focusing on the design
of the secession rules. See e.g. Bolton and Roland (1997), Alesina et al. (1995), Alesina and Spolaore (1997),
and Fidrmuc (2001).
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the nations to choose extremist agents. As a result, the principals may be worse o¤ under
delegation than under self-representation.5
Recently, also Gradstein (forthcoming) has argued that the option to secede may distort
the political choices made by individual regions to improve their bargaining position. While
we arrive at the same policy advice of deciding on secession in a referendum, our model
suggests that intergovernmental transfers should in general be curbed and tend to reduce
e¢ ciency, while Gradsteins framework suggests that such transfers would rather be e¢ ciency-
improving.
There are four major di¤erences between Gradsteins model and ours. First of all, Grad-
stein (forthcoming) assumes that the federal arrangement results from interregional spillovers
of a production of a public good. He also assumes that only one region provides such good,
while the other region only pays transfers. We assume, on the contrary, that the existence
of a federation creates a gross benet to both members, independently of whether any in-
terregional transfers are paid. This is consistent with the view that the main benets of
the European Union to its member states result from the existence of a common market
and legal framework, which are shared by all member states, rather than from transfers that
would be used to correct for ine¢ cient levels of pollution or infrastructure spending in some
member states. Second, Gradstein assumes that interregional transfers are a way to realize
e¢ ciency gains, in case they would be set at an e¢ cient level. We, in turn, assume that the
benets of the common market accrue to the member states independently of whether there
are interregional transfers, and that transfers create distortions. Third, Gradstein assumes
that politicians di¤er in their preferences concerning the public good, while we assume that
politicians di¤er in two dimensions: their ability and in their stubbornness. Fourth, the
voters of a minority region would expect to be levied a larger transfer in a federation without
secession in Gradsteins model. This is in contrast with the observation that the largest
member state of the European Union, Germany, is also the largest net contributor. Many
small states, like Greece and Portugal, are net recipients. In our model, there is no single
member state to which majority of voters would belong.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss empirical and experimental
evidence of what we call stubborn behavior. In section 3, we present a model of negotiations
between politicians representing di¤erent member states, and on the political process in
which member states choose their political leaders. Section 4 solves for the equilibrium with
the European Conventions proposed Article 59. Section 5 solves for an equilibrium in case
withdrawal would require a majority in a referendum in the member state whose political
leader would like to withdraw from the Union. Section 6 concludes.
5For more discussion on strategic delegation in general, see e.g. Laussel (2002).
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2 Are there stubborn leaders?
In an Ultimatum game, two subjects have to agree on a division of a xed sum of money.
The proposer can make only one proposal on how to divide the money, and the responder
can either accept or reject. If the responder accepts, both subjects receive what is proposed.
If the responder rejects, both parties receive a zero payo¤, and the game ends. Under
standard assumption that both players are rational and care only about monetary payo¤s,
the responder should accept any positive payo¤. The proposer would then o¤er the smallest
possible amount to the responder, who would then accept. Experimental evidence, across
hundreds of experiments, suggests that 40 to 60 percent of people reject o¤ers giving them
less than 20 percent of the pie. This result is robust across countries and holds also with
large stakes equalling 2-3 months salaries (Fehr and Fischbacher 2002). The result cannot
be explained away by reputation concerns, as it arises also in anonymous interaction via
computers, and also when the players know that they play the game only once (or for the
last time in repeated games). The stubborn leaders in our model behave much like the
individuals in these experiments who refuse positive payo¤s.
Intergovernmental negotiations in the European Union are often subject to various ulti-
mata. Even without Article 59, certain politicians have been able to extract considerable
concessions from others by blocking decision making or by threatening to do that. In 1965,
President de Gaulle resorted to the so-called empty chair policy as he viewed that the Euro-
pean Commission had exceeded its powers: For six months, France refused to participate in
the European Community institutions. This crisis led to the Luxembourg compromise, giving
member states a veto power when they believe that their fundamental interests are under
threat. In 1984, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher threatened to veto any further expansion
of spending, unless other countries give in to her demand "I want my money back". Finally,
the other member states gave in, handing the UK a transfer accounting still to billions of
euros annually. In March 2003, the Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi insisted that
the other EU member states exempt the Italian farmers from nes for exceeding Common
Agriculture Policy milk production quotas before agreement on a tax package that includes
a cross-border savings levy and a code of conduct for corporate taxation. When the other
member states refused such demands, Italy vetoed the proposed package.
A prominent example of stubborn leaders comes from Cyprus. The negotiation process
unfolded as follows. As the Greek and Turkish Cypriot sides could not agree on the terms of
reunication, the United Nations Secretary General Ko Annan nalized the plan. Neither
President was satised with the result, and both actively campaigned against the reunica-
tion plan. Greek Cypriots voted against the plan in simultaneous referenda in April 2004,
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convinced by their Presidents argument that it gave too many concessions to the Turkish
Cypriots. The plan was supported by 65 percent of Turkish Cypriot voters, and also by their
Prime Minister. Nonetheless, Turkish Cypriot President Rauf Denktash opposed the plan
until the very end, preferring to give up the benets from reunication rather than accepting
a compromise which did not meet his previous ultimata.
Tensions between political leaders also contributed to the split of Czechoslovakia. By
1992, confrontation between Czech and Slovak political leaders e¤ectively blocked the daily
functioning of the federal government. President Havel and other federalists were unable to
prevent the split, and Vaclav Klaus on the Czech side and Vladimir Meciar on the Slovak side
negotiated a deal that the two republics would become separate at the beginning of 1993,
even though most people in the Czech Republic and Slovakia opposed the split. There was
no referendum.
An alternative explanation for confrontational behavior in the negotiations would be
to assume that politicians di¤er in their attitudes towards European integration. Citizens
could then hope to extract concessions from others by electing politicians who oppose EU
membership, and would therefore require concessions from others in order to stay. We have
chosen to focus on stubborn politicians, as negative attitudes towards European integration
are likely to harm also day-to-day politics on the European level. This would cause member
states who have elected such leaders to lose part of the benets from the European Union.
It is not clear that the expected concessions would su¢ ce to cover such losses. Our policy
conclusion of the desirability of a referendum would hold also when threats of secession arise
from politicians who oppose EU membership as a matter of principle.
3 The model
3.1 The Union
Initially, there are N , N 2 f2; 3; :::g, member states in the Union. The mass of population is
unity in each member state, and the aggregate surplus of maintaining the Union is S(N) > 0
for the population of each member state. We think of this surplus as stemming from common
markets, common currency, etc. Without a Union, there is no surplus: S(1) = S(0) = 0: We
assume that S (N) > S (N   1) for all N .
The Union may tax the member states in order to give them back transfers. There is
a cost , 0   < 1, of raising one unit of tax revenue. Parameter  reects the cost of
transferring income, a strictly positive  implies that lump-sum transfers between countries
are not available. It is assumed that all the member states always pay the same amount of
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taxes (in case the Union is maintained), but that the transfers may di¤er. This means that
the value of the economic benets from the common market and transfers for member state
i is
S (N) + ti   (1 + )
N
NX
j=1
tj (1)
where ti  0 denotes the transfer for member state i and the last term the share of each
individual member state of the total cost of all transfers.
3.2 Citizens
Member states are populated by voters and political candidates. The voters are identical.
The candidates di¤er rst of all in terms of their ability, denoted by a; a 2 [0; a]. The ability
is related to how well the candidate is able to manage the resources under his control. In
addition, the candidates di¤er in how likely they are to give ground in the negotiations. More
specically, we assume that an elected leader must pay a utility cost b; b 2 [0; b] if he does
not carry out what he threatens to do. We denote the joint density function of a and b by
f(a; b). We call candidates for whom
b > S(N)
stubborn and other candidates ordinary. A candidate is then stubborn with probability
p(N) =
Z a
0
Z b
S(N)
f(a; b)dadb: (2)
The preferences of the voters are given by a + T , where T denotes the net value of
all economic benets from the Union. These benets consist of (1) and a possible cost from
presenting an ultimatum which we will discuss later. Also politicians receive a+T as citizens.
A politician also su¤ers a utility cost b if he has made a threat that is not carried out. In
case elected, politicians receive an additional reward su¢ ciently high to guarantee that all
politicians prefer being elected themselves, rather than abstain from running.
3.3 Timing of events
As budget frameworks in the European Union are adopted for seven years at a time, we
nd it a reasonable simplication to assume that each political leader plays the game of
negotiation only once. We study the following sequence of events: First, elections take
place in all member states. Elections may take place either simultaneously or consecutively,
without a¤ecting any results. In each election, the voters elect a leader from two competing
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candidates. In the second stage, one of the elected leaders gets an opportunity to present an
ultimatum to the leaders of the other member states. The ultimatum consists of a demand
for transfers from the Union and may be accompanied by a threat to withdraw from the
Union in case the ultimatum is not accepted. All other leaders must then decide whether to
accept or reject the ultimatum. If the ultimatum is accepted, the negotiation ends. If the
ultimatum is rejected, the politician who presented the ultimatum must decide whether to
carry out his threat.
We consider two di¤erent constitutions. In the rst one, following the draft proposal for
the EU constitution, the leader of each member state may decide on whether the threat of
secession is carried out or not. In the second one, this decision is subject to a referendum in
the member state considering withdrawal.
In the following subsections, we will discuss each of these events in more detail.
3.4 Elections
In all member states, voters choose from two competing candidates. When voters decide
which candidate to vote for, they take into account the characteristics of the candidates in
both domestic politics and in the federal negotiations, and choose the candidate who gives
them higher expected utility. The voters are identical and will therefore all prefer the same
candidate.
3.5 Ultimata
Each elected leader gets the opportunity to present an ultimatum to the other leaders with
probability 1
N
. For notational convenience, we refer to the member state that gets to present
the ultimatum as member state u. The stubbornness of the leader of member state u is bu.
An ultimatum consists of a demand of a positive transfer of resources, denoted by v  0, from
the Union, accompanied by a threat that the member state will start a process of secession
if it does not receive the demanded transfer. Presenting an ultimatum costs  > 0. We
assume that this cost is small relative to the economic benets created by the Union, more
specically, we assume that
 <
[S(N)  S(N   1)] (N   1  )
1 + 
: (3)
After that, all member states simultaneously decide whether to accept or reject the demand.
We assume that each member state accepts a given demand if indi¤erent between accepting
and rejecting. Acceptance of the ultimatum requires unanimity. If the demand is accepted by
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all member states, the negotiation ends and the member state that presented the ultimatum
receives the demanded transfer. If one of the member states rejects the demand, member
state u must decide whether to carry out its threat and withdraw from the Union.
3.6 Secession
According to the EU draft constitution, each member state may withdraw from the EU
according to its constitutional rules. At its extreme, this would mean that a government
controlling the majority of the parliament could rush through a withdrawal without needing
to consult the electorate. We model this by assuming that a political leader representing the
member state in the negotiation may decide on withdrawal. In case of secession, a former
member state ceases to contribute to the creation of federal surplus, and no longer pays for
or receives transfers from the general budget. We assume that when indi¤erent between
seceding or not, leaders choose not to secede.
Under an alternative constitution, the decision to withdraw is subject to a national ref-
erendum. In this case, the voters maximize their utility when deciding on secession.
4 Equilibrium without a referendum
In this section, we consider the case when secession is allowed without a referendum. We rst
analyze the situation with given politicians. We then consider the problem faced by national
electorates of the member states.
4.1 Equilibrium with given politicians
The following proposition fully characterizes the equilibrium for a given set of politicians
assuming that one of the elected leaders has the opportunity to present an ultimatum.
Proposition 1 The Union is always maintained, i.e. no member state withdraws from the
Union. If bu > S(N), the leader of member state u presents an ultimatum demanding
v =
N [S (N)  S (N   1)]
1 + 
.
If bu  S(N), the leader of member state u presents no ultimatum. Equilibrium payo¤s
from the Union are for member state u
S (N) +N 1 
N
v    if bu > S(N)
S (N) otherwise.
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For all other member states, the economic benets are S (N   1) if bu > S(N) and
S(N) otherwise.
Proof Consider rst the last phase of the events, namely the decision to withdraw from the
Union. If the demand has been rejected, the leader receives 0 if he withdraws from the
Union and S (N)  bu otherwise. Hence, he will withdraw if bu > S(N).
Consider then the decision to accept or reject the presented ultimatum. Since acceptance
requires unanimity, we can consider only the decision of leader j conditional on all
other leaders accepting the ultimatum (i.e. the case when the leader is pivotal). If he
accepts demand v, he receives S (N)   1+
N
v. If he rejects, he receives S (N   1) if
bu > S(N) and S (N) otherwise. Hence, if bu > S(N) the ultimatum is accepted if
v  N [S(N) S(N 1)]
1+
and rejected otherwise. If bu  S(N) all ultimata with v > 0 are
rejected.
Finally, consider the decision to present an ultimatum. Assume rst that bu > S(N),
that is, if the demand is rejected member state u will withdraw from the Union. By not
presenting an ultimatum, the member state receives S (N). By presenting an ultimatum,
the member state receives
S (N) + v   1 + 
N
v    if 0 < v  N [S (N)  S (N   1)]
1 + 
; and
  if v > N [S (N)  S (N   1)]
1 + 
.
Since we assume  to be small (see condition (3)), it is optimal to demand v =
N [S(N) S(N 1)]
1+
when bu > S(N). Assume then that bu  S(N), that is, rejected demand
does not lead to withdrawal. Then it is optimal not to present an ultimatum, since no
ultimatum would be accepted. Equilibrium payo¤s are found by inserting the equilibrium
demand into (1), and by subtracting  from member state u, if this has presented an
ultimatum.
To summarize, a member state is weakly better o¤ if its leader is stubborn, i.e. bu > S(N).
This is because only stubborn leaders are able to extract concessions from the other member
states if given the opportunity to present an ultimatum.
4.2 Voting equilibrium
Recall that in each election, there are two candidates. When voters have a choice between two
ordinary or two stubborn politicians, they choose the one with higher ability, and randomize
in case candidates have the same ability. It remains to analyze the case when voters have a
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choice between an ordinary and a stubborn politician. Let as and ao denote the ability of a
stubborn and ordinary politician, respectively. We established above that each member state
is weakly better o¤ if it is represented by a stubborn politician. Thus, voters always elect
a stubborn politician if he is at least as competent as an ordinary opponent. If an ordinary
politician has a higher ability, then voters face a trade-o¤: Choosing a stubborn politician
results in a lower payo¤ a in domestic politics, and a higher payo¤ in negotiations.
For those member states whose leader is not in a position to present an ultimatum, it
does not matter whether the leader is stubborn or not. Stubbornness then matters only with
probability 1=N . The expected gain in negotiations from electing a stubborn politician is
s =
1
N

(N   1  )[S (N)  S (N   1)]
1 + 
  

: (4)
The term in brackets is the gain from having a stubborn politician who is able to present the
ultimatum, which is then multiplied by the probability of being in a position to present an
ultimatum. By (3), s > 0.
The stubborn politician is elected if and only if
as +s > ao:
In other words, a stubborn politician is elected not only if his ability is the same or higher
than that of an ordinary politician, but also when his ability is lower, but the expected
gain from concessions in federal negotiations is su¢ cient to compensate for lower quality in
domestic policies. Note that if the expected gain in the negotiation is large enough relative
to the maximum ability di¤erence, that if s > a, the stubborn politician is always elected.
Let c denote a stubbornness premium, measured as the maximum ability gap that voters
are willing to accept in disadvantage of a stubborn politician, and still elect him if the
opponent is not stubborn. This premium is given by
c = min (s; a) : (5)
where a denotes the maximum ability. The premium is always positive as a > 0 and s > 0.
If the di¤erence in abilities in favor of the ordinary candidate is less than c, the stubborn
candidate is elected. This implies our central result:
Proposition 2 Negotiations on the federal level increase the chances of stubborn candidates
to be elected.
Proof Follows from the stubbornness premium being strictly positive in all member states.
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Proposition 2 implies that
Corollary 1 Negotiations on the federal level on transfers reduce the average ability of
elected politicians.
Corollary follows as the stubbornness premium may result in less competent stubborn
candidate being elected instead of a more competent ordinary politician. This welfare loss
follows even when the stubborn politician does not have a chance to present an ultimatum.
Voters in each member state su¤er from a Prisoners dilemma: if the ability di¤erence in favor
of a more competent ordinary politician is less than c, it is individually attractive for them
to engage in a costly gamble and elect a stubborn politician of lower ability, hoping that he
has a chance to present an ultimatum, even though the process of presenting ultimata is a
negative-sum game for the whole Union.
5 Equilibrium with a referendum
In this section, we will analyze an alternative constitution, one that requires each country
that contemplates withdrawal to organize a national referendum. For the most part, the
same events are considered as above, the only di¤erence being that now if the ultimatum of
a given leader is rejected, the decision to withdraw from the Union is subject to a national
referendum.
Proposition 3 The Union is always maintained, i.e. no member state withdraws from the
Union. No leader presents an ultimatum and the economic benets from the Union are
S (N) for all member states.
Proof Consider rst the decision to withdraw from the Union. Regardless of the type of the
leader, if the electorate chooses to withdraw, each voter gets   but remaining in the
Union yields S (N)  . As a result, voters will reject withdrawal in a referendum.
Consider then the decision to accept or reject the presented ultimatum. Since the na-
tional electorate will reject withdrawal, each leader rejects positive demands by others.
Then for each leader the payo¤ is S (N) if he has not presented an ultimatum and
S (N)  b   if he has presented an ultimatum. Hence, it is never optimal to present
an ultimatum.
Proposition 3 implies that the incentive of national electorates to pay attention to stub-
bornness disappears. It is always optimal to choose the more able candidate. This is because
the need to consult the national electorate before possible secession from the Union changes
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the bargaining position of the stubborn politicians. As they can no longer use secession as a
threat, their demands for transfers from other member states are not accepted. As a result,
no transfers are paid.
6 Conclusion
In its draft Constitution for the European Union, Convention suggests that each member
state may withdraw from the European Union following its own constitutional requirements.
We argue that such a rule could lead into a use of threat of secession to extract concessions
in intergovernmental negotiations. Furthermore, the proposed article 59 may give national
electorates an incentive to elect more confrontational politicians who are able to make such
threats credibly.
We also suggest a remedy: the constitution should require that withdrawal from the EU
must be approved by the voters of the withdrawing member state in a referendum. Giving
citizens the nal say would prevent the strategic use of threat of secession as well as eliminate
the incentive to elect confrontational politicians.
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